Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decree in India.

Here the petitioner who is challenging the judgment was at the relevant time resident for a fairly long time within the jurisdiction of the foreign Court, did not approach the foreign Court under the dictates of the respondent and made out a case before the foreign Court for obtaining the judgment. Indeed in Y. Narasimha Rao (supra) itself the Supreme Court held matrimonial action filed in the forum where the wife is domiciled or habitually and permanently resides or where the wife voluntarily and effectively submits to the foreign jurisdiction or where the wife consents to the grant of the relief by the foreign Court although the jurisdiction of the foreign Court is not in accordance with the provisions of the Matrimonial Law of the parties, to be valid and the judgment of such foreign Court to be conclusive

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of decision: 25th January, 2012

+ CRL.M.C. 3845/2010

% DR. MEENA CHAUDHARY

@ DR. MEENA P.N. SINGH ..... Petitioner Through: None.

Versus

BASANT KUMAR CHAUDHARY & ORS. ..... Respondents Through: Mr. Atul Jha, Adv.

CORAM :-

HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW

JUDGMENT

RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.

1. This petition has been preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) impugning the order dated 26.08.2010 of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate dismissing the complaint under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. filed by the petitioner of offence under Section 120-B read with Section 494 and Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). This petition was listed before the learned Single Judge on 10.12.2010 when the CRL.M.C. 3845/2010 Page 1 of 8 petitioner appearing in person sought adjournment. The petitioner had also filed LPA No.64/2009 and contempt case No.C-386/2010. The petitioner on 03.05.2011, while appearing before the Division Bench in LPA No.64/2009 sought consolidation of the contempt petition as well this petition with the LPA and the matter was accordingly placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice who vide order dated 22.05.2011 directed that the contempt petition as well as this petition be placed before the same Division Bench before which the LPA was pending. It is for this reason that the matter is before us. We may also notice that though the LPA and the contempt petition have since been disposed of but the petitioner appearing in person stated that rather than sending back this petition to the learned Single Judge, we only should hear the same. In view of the said request and for the reason that by doing so, the petitioner is not being deprived of any remedy had the matter been considered by the learned Single Judge, we proceeded to hear the petitioner. The petitioner sought and was granted liberty to file written arguments which have also been filed.

CRL.M.C. 3845/2010 Page 2 of 8

2. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate after recording the statements of the petitioner and her witnesses held no case for summoning of the accused / respondent to have been made out for the reason of the petitioner herself having obtained decree of dissolution of her marriage with the respondent from the Court in U.K. and the respondent having so ceased to be the husband of the petitioner there being no question of his being guilty of the offence of bigamy under Section 494 of the IPC or of causing cruelty to the petitioner as wife under Section 498-A of the IPC. Qua the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC, reliance was also placed on the status report submitted by the police and on the petitioner having failed to make out any case of cruelty.

3. The argument of the petitioner before us, orally as well as in writing, is that the divorce decree obtained by her in U.K. being not a valid decree and hence not bringing to an end the relationship of husband and wife between the petitioner and the respondent. Reliance in this regard is placed on Smt. Satya Vs. Shri Teja Singh (1975) 1 SCC 120 and on Y. Narasimha Rao Vs. Y. Venkata Lakshmi (1991) 3 SCC 451. The CRL.M.C. 3845/2010 Page 3 of 8 Supreme Court in both Smt. Satya and Y. Narasimha Rao (supra) was faced with a situation of the husband setting up a decree of a foreign Court of dissolution of marriage as a defence to the claim / charge of the wife in the Indian Courts for maintenance or of bigamy. In both cases, the husband was found to have obtained the decree of foreign Court fraudulently.

4. The situation here is however converse. It is the petitioner herself who had obtained the decree from the foreign Court of dissolution of marriage and who now wants our Courts to ignore the same. Obviously, no case of the foreign decree having been obtained fraudulently can be said to exist in this scenario. Rather the said foreign decree was at the sole initiative of the petitioner with the respondent having no role in the same and having not even contested the same. The question which arises is, can the petitioner, who by obtaining the said decree led the respondent to believe that his marriage with the petitioner stood dissolved and that he was free to remarry, can now be permitted to challenge the foreign decree obtained herself and charge the respondent with the offence of bigamy. In CRL.M.C. 3845/2010 Page 4 of 8 our opinion, no and the complaint has been rightly dismissed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. As far back as in Asanalli Nagoor Meera Vs. K.M. Madhu Meera MANU/TN/0707/1925, a division bench of the Madras High Court held that a litigant cannot be allowed to deny the jurisdiction which he himself invoked. The same principle was recently applied by a Single Judge of the same Court in Ms. Dorothy Thomas Vs. Rex Arul MANU/TN/2876/2011 in near similar facts.

5. We may also notice that under Section 13 of CPC a foreign judgment is conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties except in cases specified thereunder. However the right if any to contend that the said foreign judgment is not conclusive can be only of the party who had himself / herself / itself not initiated the process of obtaining the said judgment and cannot be of a party at whose instance such foreign judgment has been obtained. No litigant can be allowed to abuse the process of the Courts or to approbate and reprobate as per convenience. Mention at this stage may also be made of the finding recorded by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate and not disputed before us CRL.M.C. 3845/2010 Page 5 of 8 that the petitioner in the disputes with her siblings before another Indian Court sought to justify her claim by contending herself to be a divorcee by virtue of the said foreign judgment.

6. Thus, whichever way we may look, we cannot find any error in the order of dismissal of the complaint aforesaid. We had also called for the records of the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate and have perused the pre-summoning evidence led by the petitioner. The petitioner had deposed that she was in U.K. from 1993 to 1999. She has not even whispered, alleged or made out any case of any of the grounds for the foreign judgment of dissolution of her marriage with the respondent being not conclusive. For the said foreign judgment to be not conclusive, the petitioner was required to make out a case of the same being either pronounced by a Court having no jurisdiction and / or having been not given on the merits of the case or being founded on an incorrect view of international law or the proceedings resulting therein being opposed to natural justice or having been obtained by fraud or sustaining a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in India. Moreover all the grounds CRL.M.C. 3845/2010 Page 6 of 8 specified in Section 13 of the CPC and on establishment whereof a foreign judgment can be said to be not conclusive are such which can be set up only by a party not himself/herself/itself approaching the foreign Court. The judgments cited by the petitioner cannot be read as laying down and indeed do not lay down any absolute principle that a marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 cannot be dissolved by a foreign Court.Here the petitioner who is challenging the judgment was at the relevant time resident for a fairly long time within the jurisdiction of the foreign Court, did not approach the foreign Court under the dictates of the respondent and made out a case before the foreign Court for obtaining the judgment. Indeed in Y. Narasimha Rao (supra) itself the Supreme Court held matrimonial action filed in the forum where the wife is domiciled or habitually and permanently resides or where the wife voluntarily and effectively submits to the foreign jurisdiction or where the wife consents to the grant of the relief by the foreign Court although the jurisdiction of the foreign Court is not in accordance with the provisions of the Matrimonial Law of the parties, to be valid and the judgment of such foreign Court to be conclusive. We, therefore, do not find any merit in this petition. CRL.M.C. 3845/2010 Page 7 of 8

7. Before parting with the case, we may observe that though the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate of dismissal of complaint is under Section 203 of the Cr.P.C. and is challengeable by way of Revision Petition under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C. but since the matter had remained pending before this Court, though in the circumstances aforesaid for considerable time, we did not deem it appropriate to reject this petition on the said ground.

The petition is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J

ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE

JANUARY 25, 2012

Divorce given by foreign court is conclusive under Indian law ?

“Once a decree of divorce is granted by a foreign Court after the parties submit to its jurisdiction and contest the case, the marriage stands validly dissolved, the Bombay High Court has held”.

(1)                                      (11) WP 9356/12

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Amk

WRIT PETITION NO. 9356 OF 2012

Kaustubh Sudhir Mestry ..  Petitioner

Vs.

Praveena Lakshmanan ..  Respondent

Mr. A. M. Vernekar for the Petitioner.

Mr. S. J. Mishra i/b S.R.S. Legal for the Respondent.

CORAM :  MRS. ROSHAN DALVI, J.

Date :      16th OCTOBER, 2012.

ORDER

1. Rule.  Made returnable forthwith.

2. The   petitioner   has  challenged   the   order   of   the  learned   Judge,

Family Court No.7 Mumbai dated 31

st

July, 2012 dismissing his application to

dismiss the petition for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the respondent­

wife.

3. The parties married in 2006 and went to the U.S.A. in 2006.  They

lived together in the U.S.A. until 2010.  In the meantime they had disputes.

They were residing in the U.S.A.  The petitioner­husband filed the petition for

divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage and also cruelty.

The wife filed a counter claim.  The parties applied for, opposed and ultimately

accepted an interim order by consent.  The parties appeared in person as also

through their respective attorneys in the Judicial District Harris County, Texas,

U.S.A.    The  interim  order  restrained  the   parties  from  entering  upon  their

respective places of residence.  The interim order directed the husband to pay

house rent, car and motor cycle loan and phone bill upto the end of July, 2010,

the order having been passed on 14

th

July, 2010.  The parties were directed to

pay their personal debts.  There was a temporary restraint order already passed                                                                  (2)                                      (11) WP 9356/12

which both the parties agreed to continue until further orders of the Court.

The husband was directed not to do anything with the J­2 Visa of the wife until

the final decree of divorce.  The wife was directed to allow the husband to get

his books and personal belongings from their residential premises.

4. After  this interim  order was  passed  the wife  came  to  India  on

22.08.2010.   She  filed  the petition  for  restitution of conjugal  rights and an

application under  the Domestic Violence Act  against  the petitioner­husband

and his father and mother.

5. The wife instructed her attorney  to withdraw  the counter claim

and  sent emails  to  that Court  on  30.08.2010  and  31.08.2010.   Hence  the

petition for divorce filed by the husband was to proceed without the counter

claim and without her defence.   She did not appear in  the Judicial District

Harris County, Texas, U.S.A.  thereafter.    The  decree  of  divorce  came  to  be

passed.  The aforesaid interim order, therefore, merged in the final decree of

divorce.

6. Upon  the  decree of  divorce  being  granted,  the marriage  of  the

parties  stood   dissolved.     Hence   the   husband  applied  in   the   Family   Court,

Mumbai  for  dismissal  of  the  petition  of  restitution  of  conjugal  rights  as it

would not then survive.  That application has been dismissed.

7. The wife would contend that the Judicial District Harris County,

Texas, U.S.A. would  have no jurisdiction  and  the  decree  of  divorce  passed

would not become a final judgment conclusive upon both the parties.  This is

upon the premise that she did not appear before the Judicial District Harris

County,  Texas,  U.S.A.     Her   contention   is incorrect.    She   submitted  to  the

jurisdiction of the District court and argued her case on merits.  This can be

seen not only from the counter claim which was filed by her attorney but the

interim order which has been signed by herself.  The parties, therefore, agreed                                                                  (3)                                      (11) WP 9356/12

and consented to the aforesaid interim order.

8. The   wife   would   further   contend   that   she   appeared   under   the

threat of the husband that J­2 Visa would be cancelled.  That case of threat is

rather unusual.  In para 4 of her petition in the Family court she has stated that

due to mental pressure of forcible deportation on the ground that the husband

would withdraw his support so that the J­2 Visa would be cancelled and she

would be deported, she “opposed” the interim application.

9. One   would   accept   a   party   under   threat   not   to   oppose   any

application but her own admission that she opposed the application shows the

submission  to  the jurisdiction  of  that  Court.    She,  therefore,  contested  on

merits  the case of  the husband by  filing a counter claim  and opposing  the

interim application and the order came to be passed as above signed by both

the   parties.  Withdrawing   her   consent   later   after   submitting   to   the   Courts

jurisdiction does not matter.

10. She would further contend that the ground of divorce would be

different in the Courts of the U.S.A. and hence no decree of divorce can stand

in India.  That contention is also incorrect that the grounds of divorce in this

case is not only irretrievable breakdown of marriage but also cruelty which is

recognized by Courts in India.

11. The wife  would  contend  that  as  the  parties were  domiciled in

India the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 would apply.  They last resided in Mumbai,

India before they went to the U.S.A.  It was for a temporary period.  Hence

their domicile continued.   Hence only Courts in Mumbai,  India would have

jurisdiction.  This would be if the wife did not submit to the jurisdiction of any

other Court and contest the petition on merits as she did.

12. The foreign judgment obtained by the husband being the decree of

divorce is conclusive because it is pronounced by  the Court in  the State in                                                                  (4)                                      (11) WP 9356/12

which they then lived.  It has been given on the merits of the case because the

wife opposed the interim application.  It is not founded upon any breach of any

law in  force in  India because it is  for a decree of divorce inter alia on  the

ground of cruelty which is in terms of the law in force in India.  The judgment

is not ex parte since the wife submitted to the jurisdiction upon being served,

“opposed”   the   interim   reliefs   and   thereafter   instructed   her   attorney   to

withdraw   her   counter   claim   thus   withdrawing   any   defence   against   the

husband’s   petition   and   knowingly   allowing   him   to   proceed   with   his   own

petition.

13. Consequently there was no protest by the wife.  There is no fraud

upon which the judgment came to be passed and the threat, if any, resulted in

her opposition in the District Court where she submitted to that jurisdiction.

Hence the judgments relied upon on her behalf  do not apply.

14. The only judgment which applies is the case of Y. Narasimha Rao

& Ors. Vs. Y. Venkata Lakshmi & Anr. (1991) 3 SCC 451.  In para 20 of that

judgment,   upon   considering   the   purview   of   conclusiveness   of   the   foreign

judgments,  the  Supreme Court laid  down  the exceptions when  the  foreign

judgments would be binding upon parties:

(1) That  the   parties  were  habitually  residing  where  the  relief  was

granted.

(2) The respondent submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign Court

granting  the  relief  and  contested  the  claim  on  the  grounds  available

under the matrimonial law where the parties were married

and

(3) The respondent consented to the grant of relief even though it was

not in accordance with the provisions of matrimonial law of the parties.

15. In this case the parties were then habitually residing in the State

of Texas.  The respondent submitted to the jurisdiction of the Judicial District                                                                  (5)                                      (11) WP 9356/12

Court of Harris County, Texas, U.S.A.  The respondent contested the claim on

the ground of cruelty.  The respondent consented to the interim order passed

as above by signing the interim order herself and also by her attorney.   The

respondent consented to the grant of relief by that Court.

16. This   being  the  law,  the   impugned   order   of   the  learned  Judge

would deserve to be interfered with.  Though it is seen that the learned Judge

has   painstakingly   considered   the   law   relating   to   conclusiveness   of   foreign

judgments, the view taken by the learned Judge in the impugned order seen to

be erroneous.  Once the decree of divorce is granted by a foreign Court after

the   parties   submit   to   its   jurisdiction   and   after   contest   or   agreement,   the

marriage stands validly dissolved.   Nothing  further survives in the marriage.

Therefore the conjugal rights cannot be restituted and hence the petition for

conjugal   rights   or   even   any   other   petition   cannot   proceed   and   must   be

dismissed as infructuous.   It is an abuse of legal process to adjudicate upon

matters  already  decided  by  foreign  Courts  which  are  conclusive  under  the

Indian Laws.

17. Consequently  the impugned  order of  the learned  Judge, Family

Court   No.7,  Mumbai   dated   31

st

July,   2012   is   set   aside.     The   petition   for

restitution of conjugal rights  filed by  the wife in  the Family Court, Mumbai

itself stands dismissed.

18. Rule is accordingly made absolute.

(ROSHAN DALVI, J.)